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  Abstract 
 
The paper looks at the experience of advanced economies in dealing with employment volatility. 
It examines in detail the impact of labour market institutions on equilibrium unemployment and 
the possible lessons for emerging market economies trying to design policy for dealing with 
unemployment and a wider, growing demand for social protection from their citizens.  Part of the 
paper concentrates on t he transition economies whose institutional context may be relevant to 
other emerging markets. Some leading principles in policy design are elaborated that take into 
account some of the common features of emerging markets, notably a p rotected public sector, 
large informal sectors and weak institutions. 
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The H uman D evelopment R esearch P aper ( HDRP) S eries i s a m edium f or s haring  recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not  necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 
 
1. Introduction 
Most individuals’ welfare is determined by their place in the labour market and by the 
efficiency with which they are individually matched to employment, as also by the 
aggregate efficiency of that market. Fluctuations in income and employment that 
accompany the business cycle remain substantial with unemployment also experiencing 
considerable volatility. The recession that started in 2007 has, for example, seen sharp 
movements in all these aggregates. At the extreme, the Spanish unemployment rate has 
doubled to over 20% in less than 24 months! Elsewhere within the OECD, less dramatic 
but still significant, changes to both employment and unemployment rates have been 
induced with implications for earnings and income. 
While less transparent, many of the same features are at work in developing 
and/or emerging markets. Although fluctuations in open unemployment are generally 
harder to observe –  and sometimes a less meaningful indicator –  the extent of 
underemployment involving variation in hours worked and therefore in income, tends to 
be substantial
1. Certainly, the current downturn has exerted a large impact on 
employment in a range of emerging markets, although the elasticity of employment to 
output changes has varied very widely across countries
2
                                                 
1  Interestingly, the US under-employment rate, which includes those whose hours have 
been cut and those working part time for lack of full time positions, was 16.8% in 
February 2010 at a time when the unemployment rate was 9.7%. Recourse to adjustment 
to hours worked has been a feature of the current recession in a range of OECD countries, 
most notably, in Germany. 
. A widely cited instance has 
been China where job losses in the coastal regions in 2008-2009, linked to falling 
demand for exports, have resulted in significant numbers of workers returning to the 
2  For example, between 2008-2009 output fell by over 5% but unemployment increased 
by less than 1.5% in Mexico, whereas in Turkey unemployment increased faster than the 
fall in output over the same period. See ILO (2010) 2 
 
countryside.  Yet, even absent the current recession, the question of employment 
volatility and, in particular, the issue of what to do about unemployment, has become an 
increasingly prominent policy challenge. Indeed how to address employment volatility in 
middle income emerging markets, where both income levels and institutions are 
potentially capable of supporting an organised response, is the subject of this paper.  
In the advanced market economies, employment volatility and its associated 
individual risk has been widely addressed since the 1940s -  particularly in Western 
Europe  -  through a variety of welfare programmes, most notably, unemployment 
insurance.  Spending on social protection in most Western Europe countries now ranges 
between 25-30% of GDP
3. While the architecture and coverage of such programmes has 
remained notably leaner in North America, even there the trend has been towards 
providing more fall-backs in the case of job loss in terms of both generosity and 
coverage. The current recession has also forced some further convergence. In the USA 
discretionary social spending –  including unemployment benefits - has accounted for 
nearly 40% of additional fiscal or stimulus spending. In the G-20 grouping of countries 
almost half have extended the duration of unemployment benefits in 2009-10 while over 
a third have expanded the coverage of unemployment benefits
4
                                                 
3  This is when using Eurostat data where social protection comprises spending on 
sickness and health care, disability, old age, survivors, family/child benefits, 
unemployment, housing and social exclusion. 
. By 2009 around 150 
countries worldwide were actually operating some form of unemployment compensation 
programme, including a large number of developing countries. Even so, while roughly 
4  Note, however, that the share of the unemployed receiving benefits continues to vary 
very substantially across countries. In the USA and Canada only around 40% received 
benefits in 2008 compared to between 60-90% in the major Western European countries 
(excluding the UK where the share was closer to 50%), see ILO (2010).  3 
 
half the world’s population in 2009 lives in countries with some form of unemployment 
compensation, the average amount of compensation – defined as wage loss replacement - 
remains small at around 10%
5. Nevertheless, even if self-insurance and/or household 
based fallbacks continue to be the dominant mechanism for coping with employment 
shocks in developing countries
6
This paper has several goals. It aims, first, to look at the experience of the 
advanced market countries in dealing with employment volatility, paying particular 
attention to the role of policies dealing with employment protection and unemployment 
benefits. It considers the evidence regarding the impact of labour market institutions on 
equilibrium unemployment and hence what sorts of lessons might be derived from 
cumulative experience in these countries.  In addition, it places this in the context of the 
demand for policy changes induced by wider integration into global markets and the 
associated risk that this has implied. The emphasis in the paper is mainly on to two sorts 
of interventions; those relating to the provision of unemployment benefits – normally 
financed on an insurance basis –  and employment protection.  In addition, special 
attention is paid to a set of emerging markets – namely the so-called transition countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe – that emerged from the planned economy with a more 
developed institutional structure and commitment to employment stability than most 
comparator countries at similar income levels. It is conjectured that these countries might 
, there is a clear increase in the incidence of publicly 
supported schemes for introducing or augmenting income/employment risk mitigation – 
not least because of growing demand from citizens and other interest groups.   
                                                 
5  Vroman and  Bruntseva (2009) 
6  Not only is the replacement rate low, but coverage is often small. Data for Argentina, 
Brazil, China, South Africa and Turkey put coverage in the range of 7-12%, rising to 
around 25% in Russia. 4 
 
offer insight into the ways in which labour market institutions affect the overall 
performance of the labour market and hence offer some partial clues to their suitability 
elsewhere in the emerging market world. The final part of the paper addresses the 
question of what other emerging markets, such as China or Brazil, should do in terms of 
designing labour market interventions and institutions that can help cope with 
unemployment in ways that avoid many of the pitfalls experienced in the advanced 
market economies and are  also feasible from both a financing and institutional 
perspective.  
 
2. Mitigating employment risk 
Explicit publicly supported programmes addressed to unemployment date back in Europe 
to the end of the nineteenth century but in the main have emerged in the aftermath of the 
two world wars. One argument has explained the timing not only in terms of avoiding a 
repeat of the Great Depression of the 1930s, but also to a trade-off between providing 
greater income protection to citizens while pursuing greater trade opening and exposure 
to the world economy.  For example, Rodrik (1998) has argued that larger governments 
have resulted as the price for citizens accepting greater external risk. That risk –  as 
measured by volatility of the terms of trade and the product concentration of exports - has 
in turn been argued to lead to greater volatility in domestic income and consumption. The 
operative assumption is that larger government size will be associated with lower 
volatility, for example by controlling a larger share of government resources or funding 
counter-cyclical policies, such as unemployment benefits. Indeed, in the richer countries, 
greater external risk has no statistically significant impact on government consumption 5 
 
but rather spending on social security and welfare or transfers is correlated with external 
risk. For countries with less robust institutions – including most emerging markets – the 
prediction is that government size – as primarily measured by government consumption - 
will tend to be larger the more open the economy. This is not because of openness per se 
but because of the external risk that openness implies.   
As a simple measure of external risk, Chart 1 indicates for a sample of emerging 
markets that openness has clearly increased since the early 1980s and often very 
significantly. A measure of income terms of trade risk that compares the 1980s with the 
period since 2000 gives more ambiguous results but suggests that for some of these 
emerging markets volatility – as measured by the standard deviation of the income terms 
of trade - has also increased.  In this context, it appears – in an echo of what occurred in 
Europe post-1945 - that there has been a shift in the preferences of citizens towards 
greater social insurance against external risk.  While the exact causality is hard to 
identify, it would appear that this shift traces to a combination of growth in incomes 
(Wagner’s Law) – and with it the size of the middle class – but also the independent 
effect of the growth in externally conditioned risk. This risk has, of course, been recently 
accentuated by the impact of the 2007 recession and the slowdown in trade that resulted. 
Public policy is increasingly been pushed to extend beyond compensatory transfers – 
conditional or unconditional –  for  those facing persistent income inadequacy to 
addressing the wider concerns of citizens for more protection against income and 
employment variability and risk
7
                                                 
7  There is some debate over the evolution of the labour share, particularly in the 
advanced market economies. Rodriguez (2009) argues that the labour share has fallen in 
recent decades. While the factors behind this are complex, it is possible that trade 
.  6 
 
Table 1 reports some responses from the 2005/6 round of the World Values 
Survey for a number of emerging markets. The table reports responses to two related 
questions. The first asked about the respondent’s view of the desirability or otherwise of 
democracy. Depending on whether the respondent considered democracy desirable or 
not, they were then asked whether the provision of state aid for unemployment was a key 
feature of democracy. Responses to the latter question were in ascending order between 1 
and 10.  For those considering democracy to be broadly desirable, the table shows that 
the mean response ranged between 5 and 7.7. For a minority of respondents considering 
democracy not to be desirable, responses had a broadly similar range, albeit with some 
differences in the direction of change across countries. While these responses in the 
World Values Survey are – it should be stressed - only very indicative, they do suggest 
that citizens mostly consider state support for the unemployed to be an important feature 
of democracy. Country level opinion surveys also tend to confirm the view that citizens 
in an increasing group of countries view protection against employment risk as important.  
Two strands of the argument so far have emerged. The first is that external risk 
appears to have increased for a number of middle income emerging markets. The second 
is that, for a variety of reasons, there appears to be an increased appetite among citizens 
of some of these countries for publicly led abatement of this risk. There is also a further 
dimension that is particularly relevant in East Asia, notably China. That is the current 
need for rebalancing the economy and raising domestic consumption. The latter has been 
kept in check by savings rates and consumption decisions that have been driven by low 
insurance and absent public provision of services and fallbacks. In short, macroeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                 
opening has played a role. Data for the UK show no clear trend for last 35 years, but 
excluding top 1% shows a clear decline after 1989/90 (see Atkinson (2005)).  7 
 
imperatives, as much as those emanating from long run structural change, make 
consideration of how to deal with individual risk increasingly central to the policy 
agenda. However, these pressures are also occurring in the continuing context of limits 
(often quite severe) on institutional abilities and integrity. These limits materially affect 
what can be done and how (and are dealt with in more detail in Section 7 below). 
While there is some evidence that there has been an increase in risk and hence in 
employment volatility in many emerging markets, it has also been argued that increased 
external risk has been present in many OECD countries. There, this increased risk may 
have interacted with existing labour market institutions in ways that have not necessarily 
been beneficial. Thus, employment protection may have become more binding raising 
costs to firms, while unemployment benefits may have also become more costly as more 
people pass into unemployment. But the empirical evidence for the OECD countries 
regarding the conjectured increase in risk is, however, not that convincing. Even so, the 
interaction between institutions and shocks over time can have consequences for 
employment that are long lasting and not necessarily beneficial. An example widely cited 
is that the shocks of the 1970s and 1980s in Western Europe gave rise to a change in 
institutions that has only been partially undone decades later with negative consequences 
for employment
8
Despite the common role that external factors may have played in raising the 
demand for risk abatement, the model for achieving that purpose is far from obvious or 
.  But the possible longer term impact of policies designed for particular 
episodes or shocks in the OECD suggests the need for very careful attention in design in 
today’s emerging markets. 
                                                 
8  See Blanchard (2006), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) 8 
 
indeed unique. In fact, of the many elements of the policy armoury in the advanced 
market economies – a natural reference point -  those relating to the labour market remain 
ones where a persistent sense of failure in design is widely present. These perceived 
failures may straddle many elements, including affordability – the sheer cost of providing 
not only unemployment insurance - but also the associated costs of other interventions, 
whether direct – such as training – or indirect, as through the externalities arising from 
particular interventions, such as employment protection. And, of course, there are the 
issues of the impact of publicly financed transfer programmes on individual incentives 
where experience suggests that reduced incentives for job search, increased dependency 
and even across-generation transmission of habits and tastes can result from flawed 
design.  In short, the demand for labour market-centred risk reduction policies is clearly 
present, but how best to tailor design is still problematic. The next section looks at 
experience with employment related risk reduction policies in the advanced market 
economies – notably in Europe – and tries to extract some of the main lessons from these 
rather heterogeneous experiences.   
 
3. Institutions of the Labour Market  
The core features of most OECD countries include elements of employment protection 
and income protection, through unemployment insurance. Over the last 30 years there has 
been widespread reappraisal of the design of policies addressed to the labour market and, 
in particular, the unemployed in the OECD. The reasons for this reappraisal are clear. As 
Table 2 shows, unemployment in much of the OECD increased substantially in the 1970s 
and 1980s and mostly did not revert back to the low rates that existed in the 1960s. In 9 
 
addition, large shocks – such as that to Finland or Japan in the 1990s and to the global 
economy post 2007 – have led to further jumps in unemployment rates.  However, there 
has remained considerable heterogeneity in unemployment across countries and across 
time. 
Turning to employment, the picture is also again variable. In Europe alone, recent 
employment rates have ranged from lows of around 55% in Italy and Spain to highs of 
78% in Norway and Switzerland, respectively.  Inactivity rates would similarly show 
large variation. Insofar as there are patterns, those countries with high unemployment 
rates are mostly those that also have high inactivity rates and low employment rates. 
Disaggregating this information further by age and gender, the picture is also very varied. 
Certainly, it appears that incentives for work of different types of individuals and families 
– older males, females with children and so on – varies significantly across countries 
being influenced by policies on, inter alia, retirement age, child care availability as well 
as the structure of the tax system. Indeed, evidence from the OECD, suggests that 
marginal tax rates for women when their husbands work has proven important in 
explaining inactivity among women. In similar vein, benefit levels for workers at the 
lower end of the earnings spectrum have affected choices over labour force participation.   
 
3.1 Unemployment benefits 
In response to upward spikes in unemployment, policy changes have been far from 
uniform but have tended to have several common components. Aimed at reducing the 
duration effects of unemployment benefits, one general direction of change has been to 
limit the duration and level of benefits and/or make them more conditional, not least to 10 
 
try and reduce dependency.  Yet, no uniform configuration has emerged. For duration of 
benefits, currently the USA, UK, Canada and Italy limit benefits receipt to between 6-8 
months. By contrast, in Denmark workers can draw benefits for up to 48 months, while in 
Spain, Portugal, France, Finland and Norway this can extend for up to 23-24 months. 
Other material differences relate to the earnings base on which benefits are calculated – 
some countries using net, some gross earnings, the level of payments for family members 
and dependents, the extent of previous employment for eligibility, as well as whether 
insurance for workers is compulsory or voluntary – the Scandinavian countries having 
voluntary systems in contrast to all other countries in the OECD sample
9
The UK is, more generally, an interesting instance of reform, as the changes that 
have been introduced in the last 20 years have pushed the current system rather closer to 
the North American model than the approach still applied through much of Western 
Europe.  By the early 2000s the UK unemployment rate had fallen to around 5% and UK 
unemployment rates had been significantly lower than in the large continental countries, 
such as France or Germany although generally higher than in Japan, Holland or the 
Scandinavian countries.  The share of long term unemployed (> 12 months) has fallen to 
around 20% of total unemployed from a peak of over 40% in the mid-1990s. Parallel to 
these developments, the number of claimants for unemployment benefits has fallen 
sharply since the mid-1990s although this has been partly offset by a sharp rise in 
incapacity benefits, part of which can probably be attributed to ‘gaming’ the benefits 
system.   
. 
                                                 
9  The OECD provides a very useful template of characteristics for 29 member countries, 
stylizing around a 40 year-old single worker without children and an uninterrupted 
employment record. See OECD, Benefits and Wages, Paris 2007 11 
 
  The principal elements of policy have been reductions in the generosity of 
benefits, enhanced monitoring of claimants to stimulate job search and targeted 
employment programmes for specific groups, such as the disabled, lone parents and the 
long run unemployed.  For low wage workers, earned income tax credits have been 
applied, albeit with mixed results.  In terms of generosity, benefits have been capped at 
very low levels and have come more to resemble social assistance. However, for low 
wage workers with particular family characteristics, replacement rates can still be 
relatively high. For instance, OECD data show that net replacement rates for a married 
couple with one earner and two children in both the initial and long run stage of 
unemployment can approach 80% for those with relatively low ex ante earnings (defined 
as 67% of the average wage).  
In general, replacement rates have declined significantly over the past couple of 
decades. Yet looking only at average replacement rates can be misleading. Take the 
example of France; in 2007 the minimum benefit as a share of the average wage was 
around 30% but the maximum benefit was 240%.  By contrast, in the UK benefits have 
been at 9% of the average wage. Indeed, when looking at net replacement rates across 
countries, there is very large variation not only by country but also by family type. The 
OECD’s disaggregation of net replacement rates for three family types with and without 
children at different ex ante earnings levels brings out very clearly that for some family 
types – mainly those with ex ante low earnings (67% of average wages) – replacement 
rates can still be high. To give a sense of the variation: in the Netherlands, families 
having average or above (150%) average wages with children can expect to get a 
replacement rate of between 56-78%, those with low earnings would get replacement 12 
 
rates of between 83-107%.  This type of difference is common across many countries 
ranging from Japan and the USA to many European countries. Some of this difference 
also carries over into long run unemployment. In Japan low earnings families in long 
term unemployment would receive replacement rates of between 53-108% as against 35-
76% for high ex ante earnings groups. These differences not only reflect distributional 
considerations at work but also carry implications for work incentives. 
Although replacement rates are critical, it is not just the level of benefits that 
could be likely to influence unemployment but also their duration, coverage and the 
strictness of enforcement.  Calculations of benefits duration relating replacement rates for 
longer term unemployed to initial unemployed also show large variation across countries 
show that in most OECD countries, the replacement rate tends to fall sharply over time. 
Information on both coverage and strictness is less easily available, but with respect to 
the latter, it appears that closer monitoring of the unemployed and use of sanctions can be 
important in determining whether benefits have an influence on unemployment. 
Countries, like Denmark or the Netherlands, are often cited as instances where relatively 
generous replacement rates sit alongside relatively strict enforcement, thereby mitigating 
the potential for the first to affect unemployment
10
While the picture that emerges is of tightening eligibility, lower generosity of 
benefits and stricter enforcement, there is still enormous heterogeneity throughout the 
OECD, and within Western Europe. For example, Sweden and Denmark look radically 
different from the UK or France or Germany, while in the USA, state level variation 
remains significant.  As such, there is no single template that has been applied to benefits, 
. 
                                                 
10   Nickell (2002) 13 
 
even if a broad common philosophy of trying to limit disincentives for job search has 
taken hold. 
 
3.2 Employment protection 
Alongside unemployment insurance and benefits, many OECD countries continue to 
pursue policies of employment protection either through explicit legislation or de facto 
policy.  The balance between favouring more employment protection for incumbents, as 
against providing fallbacks to job losers through unemployment insurance and social 
assistance, varies quite substantially across countries. Boeri et al (2002) have argued that 
employment protection and unemployment benefits act more as substitutes than 
complements with a resulting inverse relationship between the two in Western Europe. 
This has also been linked to the political economy and the power of particular lobbies or 
vested interests in the labour market. Chart 2 relates the OECD measures of employment 
protection to the net replacement rates offered in 2007. It can be seen that there is an  ∩ 
shape with countries having higher employment protection tending to offer lower net 
replacement rates. In addition, there are a small group of Anglo-Saxon countries that 
have low employment protection and low replacement rates.  
Employment protection measures –  as well as contractual forms –  have been 
widely viewed as affecting the ease with which new entrants – younger workers – can get 
into jobs. Such protection, by definition, tends to benefit largely incumbents. By affecting 
the incentive for a firm to hire workers, employment protection can slow the speed at 
which vacancies are filled. The evidence suggests that consequently employment 
protection can adversely affect the duration of unemployment. However, differences in 14 
 
employment protection appear to be unrelated to differences in unemployment rates 
across countries.  
Protection may also affect the ability of insiders to extract rents in wage 
bargaining.  Thus, while employment protection will tend to reduce volatility in the 
labour market by reducing the firing rate, it will also tend to lower incentives for firms to 
post new jobs. Indeed, in the OECD much of recent productivity growth appears to have 
come from entry and displacement rather than from productivity growth in existing firms. 
Yet, entry and displacement – the importance of rivalry – necessarily entails job losses 
and worker displacement as well.  Bassanini et al (2009) have also used firm level data 
from OECD countries to examine the impact of employment protection on productivity 
and investment. Both papers employ a ‘difference in differences’ where sectors are 
distinguished in terms of their high and low reallocation sectors. Employment protection 
adversely affects productivity more in high reallocation sectors. Further, using a panel of 
EU firms, Leonardi and Messina (2009) find that employment protection legislation tends 
to reduce investment and capital per worker, as well as labour productivity, quite 
significantly in high relative to low reallocation sectors. Bartelsman et al (2010) have also 
argued that differences in innovation may also be explained by differences in 
employment protection insofar as higher protection reduces the incentive for firms to 
adopt more risky technology by raising the cost of separating workers. These 
considerations and the associated emergence of dual labour markets have led to 
reappraisal of the role of employment protection, even if the evidence for employment 
protection having an important and adverse impact on unemployment is far from 
conclusive. 15 
 
A closer look at the OECD employment protection scores suggests that there is 
considerable heterogeneity across countries and time
11
The introduction of differentiated contracts using temporary contracts has largely 
been motivated by the difficulties in reforming the existing systems of employment 
protection and the power of incumbents and their lobbies
.  For example, countries such as 
Spain, Greece and France have markedly higher employment protection than the USA, 
Canada or the UK while the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have intermediate scores. 
As regards trends, the evidence points to declining protection in most countries, although 
in a number of places with high protection - notably France, Norway and Spain - the 
decline has been relatively small. However, this has camouflaged some important 
nuances. A notable instance has been the proliferation of temporary contracts and 
associated dual labour markets. France and Spain offer two clear instances of where 
attempts have been made to introduce greater flexibility in a segment of the labour 
market. New hires with temporary contracts have faced significantly different 
employment contracts than those workers on permanent contracts.  
12
                                                 
11   A recent update of these measures can be found in Venn (2009). 
. French fixed term 
employment rose to around 14% of total employees by 1998 and has stayed at around 
that share thereafter. In Spain the growth in temporary contracts has been even more 
rapid in the 1990s, resulting in temporary employment accounting for between 31-33% of 
total employment in the period from 1998 to 2007.  This process was important in driving 
the reduction in the Spanish unemployment rate from over 22% in 1994 to 8% in 2007. 
However, the subsequent recession has seen a very sharp upward shift in Spanish 
unemployment towards 20% by 2010, a significant part of which can be accounted for by 
12   Saint-Paul (2000) 16 
 
the non-renewal or otherwise of temporary contract workers.  Spanish experience 
suggests that the introduction of temporary contracts led to increased volatility of 
employment by increasing both hiring and firing rates
13. The increase in the hiring rate 
cut into unemployment and into long run unemployment in particular. However, lower 
firing costs have also facilitated large separations since 2007. Other consequences of 
fixed term contracts have been a lower incentive for employers to invest in on-the-job 
training, a higher wage premium for more educated workers on permanent contracts, as 
well as impeding spatial mobility due to uncertainty
14
The impact of the current recession on a dual labour market suggests that how 
temporary contracts are implemented can also matter. A comparison of France and Spain 
since 2007 found that Spanish unemployment would have been raised by 2.5 percentage 
points less if Spain had had less stringent French employment protection legislation
.   
15
Use of temporary contracts has been most pronounced in Western Europe. 
Despite the fact that the problem of employment protection for incumbents and the 
impact on job creation is a pressing issue for many developing countries, explicit use of 
temporary contracts has been very limited. What is familiar, however, is the widespread 
inability to address head-on the extent of employment protection and wage benefits 
. 
More generally, there has been questioning of the whole strategy of temporary contracts 
with emphasis placed on replacement by a single labour contract alongside severance pay 
conditioned on tenure.  
                                                 
13   More generally, see also Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) 
14   See Bentolila, Dolado and Jimenez (2008) 
15   Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon (2009) who also note that 
unemployment benefits have been fairly similar in both France and Spain, as have wage 
bargaining institutions. 17 
 
offered to workers in the covered or formal sector. Even where this is recognised to be a 
barrier to  employment growth, policy makers have mostly preferred to use other 
instruments, such as wage subsidies, to try and boost employment. In Tunisia, a highly 
regulated labour market and high labour supply has resulted in significant and growing 
unemployment, but policy has mainly been the use of wage subsidies and other active 
labour market policies, as well as trying to raise firm entry rates
16
 
. Both set of policies 
have been costly and have had very limited results. However, European experience with 
tow-tier labour markets is unlikely to be an appropriate model for developing countries 
that are trying to change the extent of employment protection. We return to some of these 
issues in Section 5 below.   
3.3 Trade Unions 
Trade unions have been important features of the institutional landscape in Europe. Their 
impact has primarily been through the structure of wage bargaining and the result wage 
levels. In this process, union membership, coverage and the locus of bargaining have 
been generally viewed as relevant.  
In terms of membership, it is widely held that unions have declined – as has 
labour militancy – over the last forty years. Yet, the simplest time series measure of 
density – defined as the share of union members in total employees – actually shows a 
decline between 1960/64 and the end of the 1990s in eight Western European countries 
but an actual increase in eight other countries
17
                                                 
16   World Bank (2008) 
. It also shows large variation in the extent 
of changes across these countries. However, Visser’s (2006) revised series of density data 
17   Nickell (2002) 18 
 
for the period 1970-2003 show not only very large variation in union rates across 
countries but also a clear secular decline in most countries over this period. By 2003 
union density rates were lower than in 1970 in all but four European countries – namely, 
the Scandinavian countries and Belgium. In some instances, the decline has been very 
large – from nearly 22% in France to around 8%, from 45% in the UK to 30%, from 63% 
to around 35% in Austria. Similar falls in membership have occurred in other OECD 
economies, such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan, with particularly large falls in 
Australia and the USA
18
While density rates are indicative of the presence of unions, they are also 
potentially misleading, as the size of membership may be a poor measure of the actual 
effect of unionisation. Coverage – defined as the share of workers whose employment is 
affected by collective agreements negotiated between employers and unions - can be very 
different from density. Most striking is the case of France where the latter was around 8% 
in 2003 while coverage was 95%. Indeed, coverage data for most of Western Europe 
show rates of between 80-95%, except in Germany (63%) and the UK (35%). 
Decentralised bargaining in the UK accounts for this low coverage rates, as it also does 
for the USA, Canada and Japan. But elsewhere in Europe multi-employer bargaining and 
policies tend still to extend contractual outcomes to non-unionised firms.  The available 
. Unionisation rates have fallen particularly strongly in the 
transition economies, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, driven mainly by 
changes in the political system. For all these countries, changes since 2003 have been 
incompletely monitored but it seems plausible to assume that unionisation has continued 
to decline. 
                                                 
18   Unionisation rates vary a good deal across US states; for example, being around 13% 
in New Hampshire and Iowa as against around 6% in South Dakota and Louisiana 19 
 
evidence also suggests very different incidences of unionisation across private and public 
sectors – with the public sector having generally far higher density rates – as well as 
differences across groups of workers, whether cut by age, sex or type of contract. In the 
UK 2007 data show that while 60% of public sector workers remain unionised, this has 
fallen to around 16% for private sector workers. Further, over 70% of workers in the 
public sector have their earnings governed by collective agreements as against 20% in the 
private sector. In short, much of the general decline in unionisation has, indeed, occurred 
in the private sector. Yet, factors such as coverage and sectoral incidence help explain 
why despite falling membership, unionisation has continued to influence unemployment 
through wage bargaining (see Section 4 below). In addition, collective bargaining can 




3.4 Labour taxation 
Financing for labour market programmes varies widely both across the advanced market 
economies as well as in emerging and transition countries
20
                                                 
19   Venn (2009) documents collective bargaining about employment protection. The 
paper notes that in a number of countries, including Denmark, collective agreement 
provisions are significantly more generous than those in the legislation 
. With respect to 
unemployment benefits, for instance, in the Netherlands insured persons’ contributions to 
a general unemployment fund average 3.5% of covered earnings. Employers contribute 
around 5.8% of covered payroll to both the unemployment fund and a redundancy 
payment fund.  These payments also cover sickness and maternity benefits. By contrast, 
in the UK unemployment benefits are  financed out of employer and employee 
20   For detailed individual country descriptions, see the website for ‘Social Security 
Programs Throughout the World’ – www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw  20 
 
contributions that also cover sickness and maternity benefits, work injury benefits, as 
well as a specific contribution to the National Health Service.  There is no earmarking of 
unemployment financing.  Similar differences in financing arrangements exist in 
transition and emerging markets. In Poland, coverage of employed workers for 
unemployment benefits is financed by employers’ contributions of 2.45% of payroll, with 
workers not explicitly contributing for unemployment. Deficits are covered by the 
government budget.  In the Czech Republic, both employers and employees contribute 
explicitly to unemployment insurance, while in Russia unemployment benefits are 
financed from federal and local government budgets rather than from payroll taxes.  In 
Colombia, employers contribute 8.3% of annual salary with no contribution from 
employees. In Chile, individual severance accounts have been established with the 
insured contributing a base of 0.6% of monthly earnings and employers contributing 
between 2.4-3% of covered payroll depending on a worker’s contract.     
There is considerable debate over the impact of labour taxes –  including the 
payroll taxes that commonly finance unemployment insurance - on unemployment. Taxes 
that treat income equally whatever its source (earnings or benefits) should not affect the 
cost of labour to firms and hence not affect unemployment. Theoretically, there are 
grounds for assuming that taxes that drive a difference between take home and cost of 
labour to the firm –  the so-called tax wedge -  may have a negative impact on 
employment. That would be true if taxes raised labour costs and affected firms’ demand 
for labour.  It could also be possible that different taxes had different effects. In the latter 
regard, evidence suggests that there is no significant differential impact of payroll, 
income or consumption taxes – the standard components of labour taxation – on labour 21 
 
costs and hence on employment.  However, when turning to the impact of total labour 
taxation on employment the evidence appears more ambiguous.  
Cross-section studies using OECD data have indicated that an increase in the tax 
wedge can raise real labour costs
21  and adversely affect employment and raise 
unemployment. A 10% increase in the  tax wedge has been estimated to reduce the 
employment rate by between 0.3 - 2.7%, while the effect on the unemployment rate has 
been between 1 - 2%.  Nickell et al (2003) use a fixed effect panel which similarly finds 
an increase of just over 1% in unemployment.  An interesting regional study for Sweden 
looking at whether regional differences in payroll taxes translated into differences in 
employment has found no significant effect, although it is possible that lower tax rates 
may have had a positive impact through encouraging entry of new firms. A large 
reduction in the payroll tax rate did, however, have an unambiguous impact on wages as 
employers and workers appear to have treated the reduction as a windfall to be shared, 
mainly to the benefit of employers
22
                                                 
21   For example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Nickell et al (2002), Scarpetta (1996), 
Nickell and Layard (1999), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001) 
. There is also evidence from Europe that tax 
incentives can materially affect individuals’ at the margin of being employed, more than 
they may affect the amount of hours worked by those already in work.  Further, major 
effects of the tax wedge are only likely to occur for low wage workers where additional 
contributions cannot be shifted to workers and hence lead to an increase in costs. To 
address these concerns, there has been increasing experimentation with in-work tax 
22   Bennmarker, Mellander and Ockert (2008) 22 
 
credits, particularly in the UK where there is some evidence that they have helped induce 
some types of workers to take up employment
23
Studies from non-OECD settings also paint a mixed picture. Gruber (1997) used 
Chilean data and found that a 1981 reduction of payroll taxes by 25% was almost fully 
shifted on to wages with no significant employment effects. A more recent exercise using 
Argentine data for the period from 1995 to 2001 found that changes were only partly 
shifted to wages and that there was no significant effect on employment. By contrast, 
using the case of a large increase in payroll taxes in Colombia after 1993, Kugler (2009) 
found that 20% of the increase was passed on to workers in the form of lower wages – a 
finding consistent with Heckman and Pages’ (2004) wider study for Latin America which 
found a 33% shifting. In the Colombian instance, the impact of a 10% rise in payroll 
taxes was to lower formal employment – particularly of production workers - by up to 
5%.  On balance, the empirical evidence suggests that labour taxation can affect 
employment but not necessarily by large magnitudes.  
. 
Turning to the actual evolution of labour taxation, the data show that in Western 
Europe there has been a substantial increase in the tax wedge since the 1960s. Between 
1960 and 1964 the average tax wedge in Western Europe was around 38% with a range 
of 19% (Spain) to 57% (Italy). By 1996-2000 it had risen to over 53% with a range of 
33% (Ireland) to 77% (Sweden)
24
                                                 
23   The extent to which this is the case depends very much on design. A review of the 
UK’s Working Families  Tax Credit indicated that employment of lone mothers did 
increase but that was not the case for low income couples where incentives actually 
deteriorated, see Brewer (2009) 
. Subsequently, there have been attempts to reduce 
labour taxation, so that in 2008 the average rate had fallen to around 42% for the same 15 
24   CEP/LSE database 23 
 
European countries
25. In the USA and Canada the total tax rate in 2008 was slightly 
below or the same as their 1960-64 rates at around 30-31% while in Japan the tax rate 
had climbed from 25% to 29.5% by 2008
26
While much of the increase in the wedge can be attributed to increases in personal 
income tax, social security contributions by employers and employees constitute the 
largest component for many countries. In Belgium and Germany, for example, employer 
and employee contributions to around 34% of labour costs or between 60-66% of the 
total tax wedge, while in France contributions comprise nearly 40% of labour costs, as 
against 10% for income tax. In Denmark, personal income tax is the largest component at 
over 30% with contributions accounting for only 11%. In the so-called Anglo-Saxon 
countries, contributions tend to be lower than the OECD average being in the range of 
14%-18% for the UK, North America and Canada and falling to under 6% for Australia.  
. However, the general picture again remains 
one of considerable heterogeneity across countries. At present, a country like Ireland has 
a tax wedge below 23% while Belgium’s is 56%.   
 
4. Some consequences of labour market institutions 
The growth in OECD unemployment – as well as its persistence – in and after the 1970s 
has spawned considerable interest in understanding how the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment has been affected by institutions, shocks and other factors. The operative 
assumptions have been that the equilibrium level of unemployment will be affected by 
any variable that influences the ease with which unemployed individuals can be matched 
                                                 
25   The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.  
26   The 2008 numbers come from OECD (2008). 24 
 
to available job vacancies, as well as by any variable that affects the way in which wage 
bargaining occurs.   Variation in unemployment across countries after 1980 appears to 
be well explained by differences in labour market institutions
27. A series of papers have 
also tried to explain the time series variation in employment
28
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have also used five year averages with baseline 
variables and interactions to argue that it has not so much been institutions by themselves 
but the interaction of institutions and shocks that has been behind persistence of high 
unemployment in Western Europe.  Thus, shocks – such as in the 1970s – may have lead 
to changes in institutions, such as increases in the generosity of benefits. These in turn 
may have contributed to the persistence of high unemployment leading to further 
institutional adaptation, albeit not necessarily a return to previous institutional 
arrangements. These adaptations, it has been argued, can develop their own dynamic; 
.  Nickell et al (2005) used 
annual data for the OECD and include variables that could explain deviations of 
unemployment from its equilibrium level. Such variables include aggregate demand, 
productivity and wage shocks. In addition, they include time series measures of 
institutional variables, including, inter alia, for employment protection, employment 
taxes, replacement rates and benefits duration. They argue that over half of the upward 
shift in equilibrium unemployment over the period 1960-1995 can be explained by 
changes in institutions. In particular, they found that (in order of importance) the benefits 
system; labour taxes, unions and changes in laws for employment protection have been 
contributory factors.  
                                                 
27   See Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). See also the papers in Snower and de la 
Dehesa (1997) 
28   Aside from those directly cited in the text, see also Belot and van Ours (2001), Baker 
et al (2005), Bertola et al (2005) 25 
 
examples being the recourse to dual labour markets and contracts in parts of Continental 
Europe
29
In short, despite the evidence that institutions play a role in explaining differences 
in unemployment and changes in unemployment, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
isolate a particular configuration of institutions that tends to be consistent with better 
economic performance, particularly with respect to equilibrium unemployment. 
Consequently, Freeman (1998) has argued that there appears to be no unique institutional 
path to be followed. This agnostic conclusion contrasts with the apparently strong 
presumptions about the sort of labour market institutions and extent of labour market 
flexibility that would be optimal in, for example, the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
indicators. Indeed, this form of labour market liberalism has been widely propagated as 
the model for emerging markets to follow.  Certainly, this contrasts significantly with the 
existing situation in most emerging markets where employment protection and dual 
labour markets are widely present. What is very different, however, from the OECD 
setting is the absence – except in the former socialist or transition countries - of organised 
fall-backs for workers losing their jobs. The next section turns to describing the situation 
currently existing across a swathe of emerging markets. 
. 
 
5. Emerging markets and their labour markets 
Most emerging markets have relied on policies of employment protection and severance 
as their main policy instruments. Indeed, employment protection has been a very 
pronounced in many developing feature with relatively small formal sector workforces 
                                                 
29   As argued in Blanchard (2006), Blanchard and Landier (2002) 26 
 
being sheltered by job protection and significant constraints on both hiring and firing. As 
such, workers in such formal sector firms – often in turn in the public sector - tend to be 
privileged not only in terms of earnings and working conditions, but also in terms of job 
security and tenure. The pervasive problem of youth unemployment – a major feature, for 
example, of the Arab countries – can be traced not only to supply side factors – high 
labour force growth rates –  but also to the limit on job creation resulting from 
employment protection of relatively small numbers of incumbents
30
Despite some serious caveats about the quality of measurement and coverage
.  
31, 
the Doing Business employment indicators provide some evidence concerning the extent 
of employment protection. For example, in 2007 firing costs expressed in weeks of salary 
were, 186 in Egypt, 108 in Indonesia, 91 in China, 87 in Vietnam, 56 in India, 37 in 
Brazil and 24 in South Africa. To put this in context, most Western European countries, 
as well as USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand had severance costs under 20 
weeks, albeit with some major exceptions, such as Portugal (99), Germany and Greece 
(both 69). Using the same source’s rigidity of employment index
32
The OECD overall employment protection indicator for 2008 allows comparison 
of additional emerging markets with the core OECD group (see Table 3). The Western 
European (excluding the Accession countries) average is around 2.05 while Canada, UK 
, the picture is more 
mixed with many advanced economies also having quite high levels of employment 
rigidity.  
                                                 
30   For an overview of developments in the Middle East and North Africa, see Salehi-
Isfahani (2010) 
31   Commander and Tinn (2009) 
32   This being an average of three sub-indices – difficulty of hiring and firing and rigidity 
of hours indices. 27 
 
and USA range between 0.2-0.75. Japan and Australasia have scores intermediate 
between Europe and the Anglo-Saxon group. The group of emerging markets have 
significantly higher employment protection than the European average, with some 
exceptions such as South Africa and most of the transition economies. What is evident is 
that employment protection continues to be an important element of policy in many of the 
leading emerging markets. Where time series evidence  is available, it suggests that 
reductions in employment protection have been more elusive in recent years in emerging 
markets than in the advanced market economies. This persistence has co-existed 
alongside dual labour markets in many of these economies so that relatively small shares 
of the labour force actually benefiting from the relatively high levels of employment 
protection. We return to this issue in Section 5 below.   
What are the consequences of employment protection policies? There is relatively 
little evidence of the impact on measures of performance. Besley and Burgess (2004) 
have used state level Indian data and find that a wider body of labour regulations 
adversely affects firm level performance. Botero et al (2004) use a larger cross country 
dataset to estimate the impact of an index of labour regulations including restrictions on 
firings and find that regulation raises unemployment, lowers labour force participation 
and raises the size of the informal or unofficial economy.  There is also, of course, a large 
body of country level evidence from a wide swathe of developing countries over a 
protracted period of time suggesting that the existence of a covered or protected sector 
has been associated with larger informal sectors, job queuing and wait unemployment
33
                                                 
33   This sort of setting is, of course, central to Harris-Todaro models as well as later 
models of segmented labour markets. Note, however, that enforcement of labour 
regulation may make de jure and de facto regulation diverge substantially. Gimpelson 
.     28 
 
A relatively small number of emerging markets have already established the 
beginnings of a system of unemployment benefits. For example, in Turkey and Korea 
compulsory unemployment insurance has been put in place. Workers have specified 
contribution and employment requirements for eligibility with benefits payable for 
between 7-10 months. The replacement rate in both countries is 50% of the earnings 
base; gross earnings in the case of Korea, net in the case of Turkey. Social security 
contributions amount to around 16% of labour costs in Korea and 29% in Turkey.  In 
China, unemployment benefits are available for a relatively small share of the urban 
labour force. Benefits are set by local governments at levels lower than the local 
minimum wage and are payable for periods that depend on pre-existing employment 
experience. The installation of unemployment benefits has been particularly widespread 
in the former socialist or transition countries (which are addressed in more detail below).   
Across regions and countries, the beneficiaries of unemployment benefits remain 
a relatively small share of the total unemployed
34.  One estimate suggests that in Latin 
America around 20% of the unemployed receive some form of unemployment 
compensation with this proportion falling to 2/3% in North Africa, the Middle East and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is coverage very limited but –  where available –  low 
replacement rates dominate
35
                                                                                                                                                 
and Kapelushnikov (2009) provide evidence from Russia of large variation in 
enforcement across regions or oblasts. 
. In some countries, such as Brazil and China – as in the 
USA – there is in addition significant regional variation as the provinces play a major 
part in determining statutory provisions for benefits. 
34   Of course, there remain issues with the measurement of the unemployed in the first 
place. 
35   See Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) 29 
 
6. Transition economies 
The transition countries are particularly interesting as for historical reasons they have had 
particularly developed welfare programmes with explicit unemployment insurance and 
fallbacks for job losers. Although most of these countries – particularly in Central Europe 
–  have income levels at the higher end of the emerging market distribution
36
To date, there has been a relatively small literature that has looked at the design and 
impact of labour market institutions in these countries. Boeri and Terrell (2002) argued 
that relatively generous non-employment benefits in Central and Eastern Europe 
established a wage floor that forced the least productive firms to shed workers and hence 
implement restructuring. By contrast, in the CIS benefits were less generous, wages more 
flexible and this – through much of the 1990s – was associated with labour hoarding and 
downward wage flexibility but also less restructuring. Consequently, unemployment 
emerged earlier and at higher incidences in Central and Eastern Europe than in countries 
further east. 
, they 
nevertheless provide interesting experimental terrain for considering what the impact of 
labor market institutions might be in other emerging markets.  
Empirical evidence on the direct effect of institutions on unemployment is mixed. 
Boeri and Burda (1996) found a small but significant effect of expenditure on active 
labour market programmes, job creation, and programme intake on outflows from 
unemployment into employment in the Czech Republic.  Ham, Svejnar and Terrell (1998, 
1999) also found that the institutional system had only a moderate effect on the duration 
                                                 
36   For example, by 2006 in PPP terms Hungary’s per capita income was roughly double 
that of Brazil and 3.5 times that of China. However, a country like Ukraine had an 
income level below that of Brazil and 30% higher than that of China while Russia was 
roughly comparable to Mexico.  30 
 
of unemployment  for both women and men in the Czech and Slovak Republics. In 
addition they found some evidence of country variation -  there was a greater 
responsiveness to the unemployment compensation system in the Czech Republic. For 
Poland, Puhani (2000) did not find any significant effect on unemployment duration 
using information on changes in the duration of unemployment benefits in Poland. 
Similarly, Micklewright and Nagy (1996) found little effect of changes to the benefit 
system on duration in Hungary. However, they also found that over time an increasing 
proportion of the unemployed searching for jobs actually received no financial support 
from the state while an increasing proportion of those in receipt of benefits did not 
search.   
In terms of trends, the data suggest several evolutions in institutions over time. First, 
the generosity of unemployment benefits has tended to fall, often quite significantly. 
Second, for employment protection, it appears that there has been a decline in most 
transition countries.  However, there is a considerable country level heterogeneity.  As 
Table 3 shows, many transition countries have employment protection scores comparable 
to Western Europe, and lower than Brazil, China or India
37
                                                 
37   See Venn (2009) 
.  However, while the 
employment protection indicator for Russia is relatively low –  equivalent to that of 
Finland or the Netherlands -  de jure  and  de facto  employment protection varies 
substantially in Russia. Data on layoffs, as well as the widespread use of wage arrears 
and involuntary hours adjustment, suggest that labour hoarding is pervasive (not only in 
Russia but also in Ukraine and other CIS countries), even if de jure  employment 
protection has decreased. Third, regarding funding, the Central European transition 31 
 
countries tend to have a total tax wedge of around 40% of which by far the greater part is 
composed of social security contributions. The total labour tax rate is thus quite similar to 
Western Europe. In the CIS it seems that the total tax wedge has fallen.  
Unemployment in the transition countries has been driven since 1990/92 by a series 
of powerful restructuring and reallocation processes. Table 4 gives the unemployment 
rate for the major countries at four year intervals. It can be seen that in most countries, 
unemployment rose sharply near the start of transition and in a number of cases persisted 
at high levels – such as in Poland - before declining sharply after 2004. In the CIS – as 
given by Russia and Ukraine –  unemployment rose less sharply. In short, these 
economies have all experienced large increases in unemployment but with some notable 
variation across countries and regions. 
In exploring whether employment and unemployment rates can be related to 
institutional variables, Lehmann and Muravyev (2010) run a set of cross country 
regressions relating in the spirit of Nickell et al., (2005). They find that employment 
protection in particular exerts a significant negative effect on the employment rate and a 
positive effect on unemployment that is, however, insignificant, except when having 
youth unemployment on the left hand side. Most of the other explanatory variables lack 
significance and/or are perversely signed. The finding that employment protection acts 
adversely against employment is consistent with findings for both the OECD and from 
other emerging markets. 
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6.1 Unemployment and unemployment benefits in transition economies 
Commander and Heitmueller (2008) look more systematically at whether unemployment 
benefits have any impact on employment and unemployment. They show that for both 
initial and long run unemployment, replacement rates in Central Europe and Russia 
tended to fall between the mid 1990s and 2005. At that time, initial replacement rates 
then ranged between 0.4-0.6. More recent – 2008 - indicators reported in Table 5 suggest 
that the replacement rate for two family types averaged around 55% and were not that 
different from the comparator advanced market economies also included in the table for 
both initial and long term unemployment.   
However, there are some important caveats.  Not all the unemployed have actually 
been eligible for unemployment benefits. Indeed, the share of those eligible has often 
declined to low levels. For example, in Hungary and Poland eligibility rates of around 0.6 
in the early/mid-1990s had fallen to around 0.2 by 1996/98. In the Czech Republic 
eligibility has remained at around 0.2/0.3 from the mid-1990s to now
38
                                                 
38   Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) report recipiency rates for 2004/2005 for 10 Central 
and Eastern European countries. With the exception of Romania, rates were in the range 
of 9-36%. In the CIS they were generally yet lower, with Russia and Ukraine (at the 
upper end of the scale) having recipiency rates of 24/25%.  
. This can partly 
be explained by changes in benefit rules but more by the falling share of short term 
unemployed. Further, the impact of an unemployment benefit system depends on the 
enforcement of the benefit rules. Evidence that is available, however, relates only to the 
strictness of the rules rather than the strictness of actual enforcement.  Hungary has had 
relatively strict rules throughout while Russia has been less strict. Finally, it should be 
noted that there have been changes other than in generosity to benefits systems since the 33 
 
early 1990s. For example, in 1997 the Poles started differentiating over the duration of 
benefits by making it conditional on the level of unemployment in a given region.  
To explore any possible relationship between unemployment rates and 
unemployment benefits, the aim would be to see whether institutions can explain time 
evolutions and whether institutions can explain specific country evolutions beyond 
common time evolutions and differences in levels.  However, given the small number of 
observations on time, it is necessary to limit the analysis to some correlations between 
unemployment and the NRRs.  Charts 3 and 4 now plot the aggregate unemployment rate 
of each country against the short and long term NRRs, respectively. Chart 5 also plots the 
relationship between unemployment and unemployment benefits using both short and 
long term NRRs for both short and long run unemployment.  There is no clear, linear 
relationship between these indicators and unemployment levels across countries. There is 
a slight positive but non-linear correlation between long-term net replacement rates and 
both the overall unemployment rate and the proportion of long-term unemployed. The 
link for the initial net replacement rates and unemployment is more complex but also 
non-linear.  There was also no clear linear relationships when controlling for country 
fixed effects. In short, unemployment benefits do not appear satisfactorily to explain 
unemployment.  
However, cross-country variations in unemployment and labour market 
institutions are only one way of analysing whether the latter do indeed play a role in 
explaining the evolution of unemployment. Using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data 
providing information on an individual level for three countries - Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic – it is possible to analyse whether the benefit system has had an 34 
 
impact on labour market flows out of unemployment into employment and inactivity over 
time. The advantage of this approach is that it is possible to control more fully for 
individual circumstances, such as unemployment duration, age and education. To do this, 
in addition to the usual control variables, the NRRs were merged into the LFS data. In 
particular, the matching took into account the number of children, marital status and 
length of unemployment spell. While this necessarily simplifies - net replacement rates 
after all are based on average wages and not on actual wages -  it introduces further 
variation into the data beyond the usual binary information. This way it is possible to link 
changes in average levels of benefits over time with individual information.  
Multinomial logistic regressions were then estimated for the three countries. 
These were done both on a pooled and annual basis with the aim of tracing changes in the 
impact of institutions on flows over time
39
                                                 
39   Full results are reported in Commander and Heitmueller (2008) 
. For flows from unemployment to 
employment in all three countries, the sign on the net replacement rate varied but was 
very rarely significant. When controlling for individual attributes, as well as region and 
time, there was no evidence that NRRs had any notable impact on flows into employment 
from unemployment. For registrations, there was no robust, common effect across 
countries. Estimates were also sensitive to whether pooled or time series data were being 
used. For Hungary, where there were more measures of benefits, recipients of disability 
benefits in particular had a lower chance of moving back into employment from 
unemployment. Being on disability benefits in Hungary reduced a person’s re-
employment probability by around 6 percentage points. Finally, when using a dummy 
variable for receipt of unemployment benefit (UI) or social assistance (UA) for the three 35 
 
countries, there was no clear effect or difference with almost all coefficients being 
insignificant.  
Interestingly, the picture looks rather different for flows from unemployment to 
inactivity. Net replacement rates and being in receipt of unemployment benefits, as well 
as being registered as unemployed, clearly reduce the likelihood of individuals becoming 
inactive in the pooled model in both the Czech Republic and Poland.  Second, pension, 
disability and child benefits significantly increase the chances of becoming inactive in 
Hungary. By contrast, the NRR variable – whether entered individually or jointly – is, as 
in the other two countries, mostly negatively signed and significant. When dummy 
variables for the receipt of benefits or social assistance are included both enter negatively.  
  In short, a careful look at a number of transition countries which have adopted 
systems of unemployment insurance provides little evidence that benefits can explain 
differences in aggregate unemployment rates across countries. Matching NRRs to micro-
data, it appears that benefits can affect outflow rates from unemployment, albeit mainly 
with respect to flows from unemployment to inactivity.  The evidence suggests that these 
effects have stayed constant, but small, over time despite the fact that benefit generosity 
has declined. Given the change in aggregate unemployment rates and an increased share 
of long-term unemployed with limited benefits entitlements, this suggests that the overall 
link between institutions and unemployment rates has been weak. The next section now 
turns to the design issues connected with the possible introduction of policies for 
reducing employed-based risk.   
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7. Design issues for emerging markets 
Previous sections have suggested that emerging markets face increased risk from 
continuing integration in to the world economy. This risk appears to be associated with a 
greater appetite among their citizens for government to provide measures of risk 
abatement in the labour market. Yet, even if these preferences are to be met, there is no 
clear template in design that emerging markets can easily. Section 3 has shown, for 
example, that there are wide differences in the design of unemployment insurance 
systems  in the OECD as well as very different degrees of employment protection. 
Further, the mix of employment protection and unemployment benefits provision varies 
significantly across countries.  
The available evidence also indicates that the dominant form of public 
intervention in the labour market in emerging markets remains employment protection 
with, in particular, use of the public sector as a vehicle for employment creation and job 
preservation. In part because of these preferences, the size of the formal sector has itself 
often remained relatively small. Employment protection has also tended to run alongside 
high costs for separation, hence high severance charges. These can impose severe 
rigidities on firms and result in both the levels of employment and the composition of 
employment being skewed in ways that are adverse from the standpoint of productivity. 
Further, while the direct beneficiaries of intervention have generally been a fairly small 
share of the labour force, the consequences of the type of intervention have been 
encompassing and have helped structure the organisation of the wider labour market. In 
this sense, policies aimed at lowering employment based income and consumption risk 
require sharp departures from past practice. Blanchard (2004) summarises the challenge 37 
 
as moving away from high severance payments and employment protection more 
generally to a system of publicly provided unemployment insurance and lower severance 
costs. Others have argued that unemployment insurance in the OECD manner is either 
too costly fiscally and/or in terms of incentives and that a greater emphasis on self-
insurance would instead be desirable
40
When considering what experience with policies –  mainly in the OECD -  of 
employment-based risk mitigation suggest for future design, several aspects stand out. 
There is a vast body of evidence that shows that social protection is costly. Including 
unemployment benefits, social protection expenditure accounts for over 25% of GDP in 
Western Europe. A body of research has also found that unemployment benefits can 
affect not only the rate of unemployment but also that for non-participation.  In particular, 
there is compelling evidence that the presence of benefits affects the duration of 
unemployment, not least as indicated by the jump in job matching that occurs when 
eligibility for receipt of benefits expires
. However, in most instances to date, such changes 
have proven to be wishful thinking, not least because of the entrenched  power of 
incumbents and vested interests.   
41
                                                 
40   For example, Vodopivec (2009) 
. The presence of unemployment benefits can 
affect workers’ incentives to search for work and the scale of these effects can be very 
significant. In emerging markets, the question of institutional capacity is also critical. 
Most emerging markets lack robust, transparent and effective institutions. This is likely to 
be a major constraint in a domain where integrity, monitoring and oversight – not least to 
limit moral hazard among recipients of transfers – is essential. In China, for example, the 
main challenge facing recently introduced labour laws remains enforcement and 
41   See, inter alia, the review in Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) 38 
 
implementation and this is a characteristic feature of most emerging markets
42. Further, 
the size of the informal economies in most emerging markets is generally very significant 
– in India, for example, the relative share of the formal sector in industrial employment is 
under 10% 
43-  and this raises further questions regarding coverage and feasibility. 
Moreover, the presence of large informal sectors often implies that unemployment is 
harder to isolate as a discrete state, as the response to job loss is for workers commonly to 
shift into lower paid informal activity
44. Finally, given that the formal sector in most 
emerging markets is in effect the privileged sector in terms of compensation, contractual 
terms and working conditions, workers losing jobs in the formal sector tend not to be 
those with most income risk or exposure to poverty
45
 
. In short, when considering 
appropriate design in the emerging market context, there is no unique set of design 
principles and practices that can readily be forced into a template.  
7.1 Merging savings and insurance? 
For some time, mainly with a view to mitigating the moral hazards involved in traditional 
systems of unemployment insurance, economists have proposed merging elements of 
saving or self insurance with a funded insurance component. For the USA, for example, 
Feldstein and others (1998) relied on simulations to argue that UISAs, or unemployment 
insurance savings accounts, could significantly lower the cost to taxpayers of providing 
unemployment benefits. Others have argued that savings for unemployment and 
                                                 
42   See OECD (2010), p171-2 
43   OECD (2007), p121 
44   However, this response is of course endogenous in the sense that absent any organised 
system of fall-backs, workers will have to seek other work or rely on family members. 
45   A point made by Vodopivec (2009).  39 
 
retirement need to be merged to be effective in making workers internalise the costs of 
unemployment benefits as well as allowing for better diffusion of risk. 
In recent years, these proposals have been advanced as a possible solution for 
some emerging markets and, indeed, there is now some experience – notably in South 
America – of just such applications.  It has been argued that their main benefit is to limit 
the disincentives for seeking work for those in receipt of transfers. Some element of self 
insurance could be expected to improve incentives for unemployed workers to search for 
work. Indeed, a recent study of a UISA programme in Chile has found, for example, that 
recipients relying primarily on UISAs behave differently than those relying on transfers 
with respect to the timing of their exit from unemployment and that this difference is 
consistent with improved work incentives
46
UISAs have been described in detail elsewhere
.   
47
                                                 
46   Van Ours et al (2010) 
. The main features that should 
be noted are that employers and in some cases workers deposit a specific share of a 
worker’s earnings in an individual savings account. In Latin America –  where these 
accounts have been most widely used –  the deductions that are made have ranged 
between 3% to over 9%. In case of job loss, workers can draw on these accounts. The 
main difference in the design of UISAs concerns the extent to which redistribution or 
borrowing is allowed. Savings accounts that allow borrowing imply that workers are not 
necessarily constrained by the volume of their savings once experiencing a bout of 
unemployment. In most instances, withdrawals are not simply bounded by the amount in 
an account, so that borrowing or recourse to an additional fund can be made for a limited 
period and/or amount.  
47   See Robalino et at (2009) for a good overview, also Vodopivec (2006) 40 
 
A widely cited example is that of Chile. There, in a system introduced since 2002, 
employees and employers have contribution rates of 0.6 and 1.6% respectively. An 
unemployment episode can lead to a worker withdrawing from the savings account to a 
maximum of five monthly payments with a replacement rate of between 30-50%. If 
savings are not adequate to cover this eventuality, the worker can draw on a Solidarity 
Fund up to this same limit, but, in this instance, only if job loss was involuntary. Further, 
access to Solidarity Fund resources has been restricted to workers with open ended, rather 
than fixed term, contracts, although this has now been partly relaxed. The Solidarity Fund 
is in turn financed by employer contributions of 0.8% of all wages of their employees 
with an additional government annual lump sum contribution. The total contribution rate, 
excluding the government element, consequently amounts to 3%.  
The Chilean and other examples are cases in which private contributions are 
supplemented by public insurance. In the case of a Solidarity Fund, the public insurance 
component has, however, an explicit redistributive aspect, although actual 
implementation of the system is in the hands of a private firm selected competitively. 
Some schemes – as in the case of the system being discussed for adoption in Jordan – 
involve borrowing with a key issue being to do with the balance at retirement. In many 
emerging markets, average life expectancy remains far closer to retirement age than in 
the OECD and this could reasonably be expected to influence behaviour by accelerating 
the incentive to borrow towards the end of their working lives. To limit possible abuse, 
those with outstanding borrowings are mostly expected to repay any excess borrowing 
but there are obvious concerns about the credibility of this provision. In some instances, 
scope for forgiveness or partial subsidisation can be introduced.  41 
 
7.2 Limits to self insurance 
While UISAs can be motivated on both macroeconomic – boosting savings rates – and 
incentive grounds, some fairly fundamental problems of design remain in the context of 
most emerging markets. Most generally, such schemes involve high levels of institutional 
capacity and integrity, as well as a financial system capable of managing and investing 
the array of individual accounts. But there is also the objection that workers –  or 
particular groups of workers – may be unable to generate sufficient savings to draw down 
over an unemployment spell. This is likely to be particularly true for young workers who 
commonly face particularly high hazards of unemployment, let alone for low wage 
earners in the informal sector. Unlike pensions which get drawn down at a defined time 
in life, episodes of unemployment tend to be far less predictable and hence timing 
becomes a potentially complicating issue. Moreover, in economies where wage levels are 
relatively low, workers may be unwilling to save for events that are hard to predict and to 
which they may attach very widely differing probabilities and, hence, priorities. Indeed, 
the savings shortfall criticism may hold in aggregate in many emerging markets, as 
savings ability over extended periods of time may also be inadequate. That need not, in 
principle, imply that the cost of any supplementary public funding would have to be 
greater than under an alternative regime, but it does signal that UISAs in emerging 
markets are likely to carry a non-trivial, fiscal cost.  
Most generally, in terms of design it appears that systems that involve a mix of self 
and public insurance might be able to address effectively some of the financing and 
equity issues, if not those of institutional capacity.  Robalino et al (2009) rightly point out 
that conventional UI systems are not necessarily progressive and argue that UISAs can be 42 
 
designed so as to redistribute to poorer workers, such as through limiting benefits and/or 
ensuring a minimum level of benefits. However, aside from any difficulty in 
implementing this,  moving to any system where redistribution (using public funds) can 
occur will raise many of the same problems as a publicly funded insurance system, such 
as with respect to incentives for job search. Such schemes also do not address the issue of 
layoffs and  the challenge of trying to make firms internalise the cost of the public 
resources used to complement any self-insurance element
48
A further – and familiar - criticism of UISAs is that they unsuitable for countries with 
large informal sectors. Given that the bulk of the workforce in many emerging markets is 
actually in the informal sector, moving to any form of self insurance with or without a 
public element would require a sea-change in behaviour among both employers and 
employees and could be expected to run into serious enforcement-cum-incentive 
problems given the institutional, taxation and other status of informal sector firms and 
individuals. Although, in principle, adopting an explicit redistributive objective through 
use of public resources could allow extension of coverage to informal workers, it is not 
clear whether (a) such an extension of coverage would match to demand, (b) would be 
administratively and institutionally feasible and finally, (c) would be free from the usual 
design problems facing more conventional programmes. Robalino et al (2009) argue that 
it would require a relatively small redistributive component that was well targeted for 
incentive and fiscal costs to be contained. But given the scale of the informal or 
uncovered sector as well as institutional and information constraints, this argument may 
be heroic. 
.  
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7.3 Facilitating reform 
Before moving to actual design principles, it should also be emphasised there are likely to 
be some important political economy considerations. Earlier sections have given details 
on the pervasive nature – and corrosive consequences – of the employment protection 
that exists in most emerging markets. However, aside from lowering employment risk for 
insiders but also reducing job creation and prolonging unemployment durations for 
others, employment protection policies have built up substantial groups of interested 
parties with an aversion to reform. As such, a major barrier to reform concerns the 
bargaining power of those already protected – incumbents. In addition, many of those 
protected are employed in public sector firms, government or in large private companies. 
Such firms are often those that are highly unionised and where the voice for protection 
remains powerful
49
                                                 
49   Union presence and bargaining coverage has also affected the extent and persistence 
of employment protection in OECD countries. Low union density need not imply low 
bargaining power but may depend on the structure of bargaining and coverage. The 
example often cited is that of France where union membership has been low and 
declining.  
. This makes their workers often potentially formidable opponents. Set 
against that is, however, the far larger constituency of workers outside the protection 
sector, including those queuing to secure jobs in the protected sector. Indeed, the median 
voter looks far closer to someone in the unorganised part of the economy in most 
emerging markets. However, they tend to form no coherent constituency – not least for 
being formed of disparate parts – and hence tend to lack effective bargaining power. In 
addition, many governments draw their political support from the protected sector and in 
effect pursue their support through providing superior benefits and other employment 
based privileges. 44 
 
A common way around these problems has been to try and use severance 
payments. While design has varied, most generally such payments have had a lump sum 
component and when appropriately discounted have been pitched lower than the NPV of 
remaining in protected employment. In some instances, there have been experiments - 
similar to those tried in Western Europe - using different types of contracts for new hires 
that also involve grandfathering incumbents.  However, while severance can have a place 
in compensating for job loss –  particularly for those who have been in a job for a 
protracted period of time - severance is inherently unsuitable as a more permanent way of 
dealing with employment and income risk. 
The relevant question is what sort of compensation mechanism can assist in 
promoting restructuring and a reduction in employment protection in formal sector firms? 
To the extent that severance can deal only with a proportion –  and possibly a small 
proportion – of possible job losers, the introduction of more general employment loss 
compensation might be able to advance a more general reform of the labour market. By 
providing some form of fallbacks for those with an enhanced employment risk, the 
objective would be to enable a wider pursuit of reforms that involve a diminution in 
employment protection. To that end, the aim would be to substitute over time 
unemployment  insurance for employment protection. Indeed, this quid pro quo  is 
essential if grafting on some element of unemployment insurance to existing systems of 
(excessive) employment protection is to be avoided. Firms would in principle gain from 
the increase in discretion regarding hiring and firing decisions. At the same time, 
reductions in payroll tax rates for employers could be made to reflect a rebalancing of 
risk sharing and to increase the attraction of the policy shift. 45 
 
7.4 Elements in design 
The above discussion has highlighted several features and constraints. For a start, 
classical systems of unemployment insurance are demanding institutionally and generally 
are plagued by major incentive problems. They are also costly.  Financing through 
payroll taxes – rates of which are commonly quite high - also imposes costs, notably with 
regard to job creation and in some instances can affect the type of jobs that are created. 
Attempts to address incentive issues through self insurance have made some headway but 
have serious drawbacks. Not only are there questions of coverage, adequacy and 
implementation but the more realistic variants of self insurance that involve elements of 
redistribution face many of the same incentive issues of more conventional approaches. 
Further, if coverage is to be extended to the informal sector not only is this likely to 
require a change in attitudes and modus operandi but also will likely involve major fiscal 
costs. Even so, despite these shortcomings, there is clearly scope for meshing together 
elements of public and self insurance to address employment-based income risk in 
emerging markets: the question is how? 
When designing any system of employment risk compensation, three players are 
relevant. The first comprises the workers whose employment risk is the primary subject 
of the policy. The second comprises the firms who employ those workers and whose 
performance and preferences will tend to determine the level and variation of 
employment over time. The third comprises government whose ability to fund and 
monitor unemployment insurance is, for a variety of reasons, superior to the other 
players.  46 
 
In the case of firms, Blanchard (2004) points out that the presence of unemployment 
insurance will distort the separation decision. High benefits will affect the productivity 
level at which firms are indifferent between employing workers and laying them off. This 
distortion can in principle be addressed – in the case of risk neutral firms – by firms being 
charged for unemployment benefits paid to workers they lay off, thereby making them 
internalise the costs of their decisions. But if the firm is risk averse and faces financial 
constraints then this sort of recovery of costs is unlikely to be feasible
50
Relying on a larger component of self insurance involves, in effect, workers putting 
aside savings to be drawn down in the event of unemployment. This can be funded in a 
variety of ways, through a payroll tax contribution, most likely of a compulsory nature, or 
through voluntary contribution. Relying, however, on a larger component of self 
insurance could also be non-neutral vis-à-vis job creation as it would depend on the level 
of deductions from firms. For workers, the level of savings could potentially have an 
impact on labour supply. And – as pointed out earlier – if there is an additional element 
.  In an emerging 
market context, particularly where reductions in employment protection could be 
expected to induce restructuring, contributions by firms on an ex post basis are unlikely 
to work. One possibility would be to use both a mix of fixed contributions – i.e., a payroll 
tax – and ex post adjustment with the share financed by payroll taxation relative to that of 
the lay off tax being varied over time and context. The underlying principle at work is 
that firms who lay off workers should pay some, if not all, of the costs of the benefits 
paid to workers who have lost their jobs. 
                                                 
50   Blanchard (2004) makes the point, however, that most lay-offs – at least in the OECD 
- do not occur when firms are distressed, suggesting that financial constraints may be less 
binding. But this may not hold for emerging markets, particularly in the context of a 
reduction in employment protection and associated restructuring. 47 
 
of public insurance, then many of the same incentive or moral hazard issues will be 
present.   
 
7.5 Sequence 
Consider an archetypical emerging market, likely to be a middle income country with an 
existing system of social security contributions and old age benefits (normally organised 
around a single state run pillar), alongside a large uncovered informal sector.  In these 
contexts, when introducing unemployment benefits, at the outset it would be necessary to 
limit coverage to workers in the organised or formal sectors with, however, the 
establishment of a parallel scheme (of which more below) aimed at extending, in a 
staggered manner, coverage towards informal sector workers. Over time, the two might 
be expected to converge.  
With respect to financing, any viable system is likely to have mixed sources of 
funding, as in the Chilean example. There clearly needs to be a public insurance 
component, not least because of the ability of the state to diversify unemployment risk
51
                                                 
51   See the wider discussion of this issue in Blanchard and Tirole (2004) 
. 
In the Chilean example, this comprises the Solidarity Fund which is part covered by 
public contributions. There is also scope for an explicit introduction of self insurance. 
Given that coverage would start only with the existing formal sector – which in many of 
these countries is relatively small – the creation of individual employment accounts could 
be feasible. Each worker would have an individual employment account held with the 
Employment Agency (but possibly implemented through a private sector operator or 
bank). Payments into that account would come from up to three sources. Employers 48 
 
would make regular (monthly) contributions set as a share of the worker’s gross wage.  
Workers would similarly be required to set aside explicitly a (lower) share of earnings 
that would be paid directly into the account.  Subject to some eligibility criteria (see 
below), workers would be able to draw on accumulated contributions up to a specified 
maximum duration. In the event that combined firm and worker contributions were 
insufficient to cover benefits, a supplemental contribution would be made by 
government.  Over time, an additional component –  a balancing item –  could be 
introduced for individual employers so that at the end of each time period (e.g., every six 
months) in the case when the cost of layoffs (as measured by the sum of unemployment 
claims) exceeded contributions, firms would have to make supplemental payments - an ex 
post adjustment. This would evidently help to reduce any need for public resources. At 
retirement age, any positive balance in the account would be transferred to the worker. To 
avoid large drawdown close to retirement, a declining age-related scale of permitted 
borrowing on any individual’s account would have to be introduced. 
The format suggested above would in effect switch payroll taxation to a specific 
employment account with a defined set of contingent benefits. The administrative 
requirements would not be trivial for this type of set up but neither would they be that 
exacting, particularly given that most of these countries already run contributory old age 
programmes. Indeed, proposals to launch individual social accounts have been floated in 
the context of some OECD countries
52
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, while a country like Egypt has already started 
introducing individual ‘smart’ cards that will contain, inter alia, citizens’ access rights to 49 
 
services and transfers.  Technological changes certainly make implementation more 
feasible.  
Turning to the design of the unemployment programme, two organising principles 
would be needed; simplicity in execution and minimisation of work disincentives. It 
would be appropriate to think of a flat rate - but experience-related - payment contingent 
on involuntary separation. Given the likely inability of any agency in these emerging 
markets to monitor effectively whether workers take jobs and leave unemployment, the 
receipt of benefits would have to be more tightly bounded, both in terms of generosity 
and duration.  
In terms of generosity, a small set of simple skills or earnings brackets (say, high, 
medium, low) would be pre-determined with possible claimants being grouped into one 
or other bracket, adjusted by years in a job (tenure), at time of application. Replacement 
rates would have to set at the lower end of the spectrum, particularly for higher ex ante 
earnings brackets. For the lowest earnings bracket, the effective replacement rate should 
be set higher. Average feasible replacement rates would have to be determined for each 
setting and subject to extensive prior scenario testing but might be expected not to exceed 
0.25. 
Eligibility criteria should be determined conditioned on the length of time in a job and 
work histories. At the outset, a minimum period of one or two years in work could be 
considered, possibly combined with a minimum level of contributions in a worker’s 
account. A limit on the number of times a claim could be made in a given period would 
need to be defined (e.g., one unemployment spell every three years). 50 
 
Duration should again be simple with a clear maximum period for receipt. Given that 
any such programme would be mainly about compensating for transitory income loss, it 
would be sensible to limit to between 3-6 months. This will not address long term 
unemployment but that should not be seen as its task.  
In the event of involuntary job loss, payments of unemployment benefits would be 
organised equivalently to earnings with weekly frequencies rather than as lump sum 
payments. Payments would need to be organised around an institution with a national 
branch network – such as Post Offices – but it is possible that other technologies, such as 
mobile phones, could also be used to make payments (drawing on experience in some 
developing countries with money transfers). 
 
7.6 Bringing in the informal sector 
Given that informal sector work is often highly variable in hours, effort and earnings and 
is difficult to monitor, isolating a unique labour market state -  unemployment  –  is 
unlikely to prove feasible. Conditioning a benefit on such a state would therefore be 
equivalently infeasible. As such an important objective of policy should be to help induce 
informal firms – particularly the larger ones – to shift into the formal sector.  Exerting 
influence at this margin may motivate more specific interventions but, in general, 
protecting workers against employment and income volatility in the informal sector is not 
best served by a system of unemployment insurance. 
As regards drawing firms into the formal economy, much, of course, depends on 
reducing barriers that range from tax levels and predictability to other regulatory costs 
and, hence, to improving the benefits to being in the formal sector. However, by raising 51 
 
the value of being formal – at least to workers – in providing some share of benefits 
available to formal sector workers, some further incentive for forms to cross-over could 
be introduced. For the firm, it depends on whether they attach value to having access to 
some unemployment insurance for their workers or merely view it as an additional cost, 
given the effectively de-regulated labour market in which they operate as informal sector 
firms.  In making this choice more attractive to firms, some temporary and selective 
financial incentives could be applied. With respect to unemployment contributions, this 
might, for example, take the form of a contributions holiday or partial relief for firms, 
alongside public supplements to worker contributions for a transitional period of up to 
several years.  In principle, such public spending could be recouped over time through the 
additional fiscal revenues that formalisation could be expected to deliver.  
While the sort of incentives described above might affect choices at the margin 
between staying informal or moving into the formal economy, the reality is likely to be 
that many small informal firms will be unreceptive. Indeed, providing income support – 
particularly to the most disadvantaged income groups - might be better achieved through 
discrete transfer programmes not necessarily tightly linked to employment status. Even 
so, there are obvious benefits to helping individual workers build, where feasible, some 
level of precautionary savings. This suggests that the route of augmented and flexible self 
insurance might be appropriate. Individuals could be encouraged to set up individual 
employment accounts using a wide branch-based network, such as the Post Office. To 
encourage participation, a matching or multiplicative contribution from public resources 
could be offered with initially that contribution being a multiple of worker or even group 
contributions. To avoid firms simply free-riding, the public top-up could, over time, be 52 
 
made conditional on the employer also contributing. Such a scheme would also have to 
have very clearly defined savings caps, given the likelihood of relatively low returns to 
savings. The scheme would not permit borrowing. As regards access to accumulated 
savings, workers could draw down savings in non-lump sum form to cover self-declared 
income shortfalls but only once a minimum threshold of savings had been attained and 
for a limited duration. Workers would also be permitted to withdraw accumulated savings 
on reaching a specified age.  Part of the reason for designing it this way would be to 
mimic the unemployment benefits framework in the formal sector with a view to raising 
demand for firms to shift into the formal economy.   
 
8. Conclusion 
Fluctuations in employment and income for workers are a feature of all economies. The 
extent to which such fluctuations are addressed through insurance and other mechanisms 
varies very widely across countries. These differences are not strictly explained by 
income levels alone. Most obviously, the USA operates a very different system of 
unemployment insurance than that present in Europe. What is common, however, is that 
as countries become richer, both income levels and the structure of risk associated with 
those income levels tend to interact in ways that have historically, as well as 
contemporaneously, resulted in greater levels of social protection and, in particular, a 
larger role for public insurance and action.  
This paper has been concerned with understanding what the impact of this greater 
level of social protection – particularly in the domains of employment protection and 
unemployment insurance – has been on the rich adopters. It has considered the evidence 53 
 
regarding the impact of labour market institutions on equilibrium unemployment and 
hence what sorts of lessons  might be derived from cumulative experience in these 
countries.  Using evidence particularly from Europe, it has been shown that the design of 
interventions can have major, long lasting and frequently adverse consequences. Yet, in 
the midst of large country heterogeneity, certain design principles can be identified that 
are of relevance to the growing number of emerging markets whose growth and changes 
in citizen aspirations mean that that they must begin to address issues of employment 
volatility. Interestingly, using information from a number of so-called transition 
economies where, for historical reasons, social protection has been more advanced, no 
clear impact of unemployment insurance on unemployment and employment can be 
found. There may, however, be  some evidence that employment protection exerts a 
negative effect on the employment rate.   
In this light, the final part of the paper has tried to develop some principles that 
can help guide labour market interventions and institutions for addressing unemployment 
in emerging markets in ways that avoid many of the pitfalls experienced in the advanced 
market economies and are also feasible from both a financing and institutional 
perspective. Given large informal sectors and often weak institutions, it is suggested that 
a mix of public insurance and self insurance should be used. Explicit employment 
programmes and funding should be established. A public insurance element will be 
necessary  –  relying only on employer and employee contributions has some major 
drawbacks.  This sort of programme can also help economies and policy make the 
transition away from regimes of high employment protection and incumbent rent seeking. 
For informal sector workers, conditioning transfers on unemployment is not feasible, but 54 
 
nevertheless measures can be taken that can encourage some informal firms to cross into 
the formal sector, while also promoting the growth of precautionary savings among 
informal sector workers. Finally, the next stage of the work will need to involve detailed 
country-specific design and simulations aimed at testing the impact of such innovations 
on worker incentives and behaviour, as well as pinning down the detailed fiscal and 
financial implications.  Institutional capacity and requirement will also need to be 
examined closely. 55 
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Table 1: Opinions regarding state support for the unemployed: evidence for selected 
emerging markets from the World Values Survey, 2005/6 
 
Country  Democracy is good  Democracy is bad  n    % good 
Argentina    6.1      6.3    919    0.95 
Brazil      7.8      7.9    1446    0.9 
Chile      7.7      6.5    895    0.93 
China      8.3      7.3    1233    0.94 
Egypt      6.7      6.5    3028    0.98 
India      8.4      7.4    1527    0.73 
Indonesia    4.4      5.4    1894    0.97 
Jordan     7.5      6.1    1423    0.76 
Morocco    8.1      7.7    1047    0.96 
Peru      6.3      6.3    1392    0.89 
South Africa    8      6.7    2840    0.9 
South Korea    7.1      7.2    1199    0.77 
Thailand    6.6      6.4    1528    0.93 
Uruguay    7.2      5.9    931    0.91 
 
Comparators 
France     6.6      6.3    974    0.9 
USA      5.7      5.9    1194    0.86 
 
No of respondents  26130      2654    28784    0.91 
 
Source: World Values Survey, 2005/2006 round 
Notes: Question 151: I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask 
what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you 
say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad of governing this country. 
Question 155: Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential 
characteristics of democracy. Please tell me how essential you think ‘state support for the 
unemployed ‘ is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all 
an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential 
characteristic of democracy”.  
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Table 2: OECD average unemployment rates, 1960-2007, 2008 and 2009 
 
Country  60/69  70-79  80-89  90-99  00-07  2008  2009    
Australia  1.8  3.7  7.6  8.8       5.7  4.2  5.6 
Austria   1.9  1.6  3.3  3.8  3.5  3.9  5.0 
Belgium  2.2  4.4  11.4  11.3  7.4  7.0  7.9 
Canada5.0  6.6  9.4  9.6  6.9  6.1  8.3 
Denmark  1.5  4.1  8.1  7.7  4.8  3.3  6.0 
Finland  1.9  3.6  4.9  11.9  8.6  6.4  8.2 
France   1.5  3.5  8.3  10.2  8.6  7.9  9.4 
Germany  0.8  2.4  6.1  7.8  9.3  7.3  7.5 
Greece   5.3  2.3  6.6  9.6  9.7  7.7  n.a 
Ireland   5.3  7.2  14.1  12.7  4.3  6.0  11.8 
Italy    5.2  6.4  10.2  11.3  8.4  6.8  7.8   
Japan    1.3  1.7  2.5  3.0  4.7  4.0  5.1 
Netherlands  0.8  3.7  9.9  6.1  3.4  2.8  3.5 
New Zealand  0.2  0.5  4.6  7.9  4.5  4.2  6.1 
Norway  1.0  1.6  2.8  4.9  3.8  2.5  n.a 
Portugal  2.5  4.7  7.4  5.6  6.2  7.8  9.6 
Spain    1.5  4.3  17.9  19.8  10.6  11.4  18.1 
Sweden  1.7  2.1  2.8  7.5  6.2  6.2  8.3 
Switzerland  0.01  0.2  0.6  3.0  3.5  3.5  4.4 
UK    1.6  3.6  9.8  8.1  5.1  5.6  n.a 
USA    4.8  6.2  7.3  5.7  5.0  5.8  9.3 
 
Source: OECD 63 
 
Table 3: OECD Overall Employment Protection indicators for 2008 
 
Western Europe        Emerging Markets 
Austria       1.93    Brazil      2.75   
Belgium      2.18    Chile      2.65 
Denmark      1.5    China      2.65 
Finland      1.96    India      2.77 
France       3.05    Indonesia    3.68 
Germany      2.12    Korea      1.9 
Greece       2.73    Mexico    3.13 
Ireland       1.11    South Africa    1.25       
Italy        1.89    Turkey     3.72       
Netherlands      1.95     
Norway      2.69 
Portugal      3.15 
Spain        2.98    Transition Countries 
Sweden      1.87    Czech Republic  1.96 
Switzerland      1.14    Hungary    1.65 
UK        0.75    Poland     1.9 
            Russia     1.92 
North America        Estonia  2.1 
USA        0.21    Slovakia    1.44 
Canada    0.75    Slovenia    2.51   
 
Australasia and Japan 
Japan        1.43 
Australia      1.15 




Source: OECD (2008) 
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Table 4:  Unemployment rates in selected transition economies, 1992-2008 
 
Country    1992    1996    2000    2004    2008 
Albania    26    12    16.8    14.4    12.7 
Bulgaria    15.3    13.5    16.3    12    5.6 
Czech Republic  2.6    3.9    8.8    8.3    4.4 
Estonia  3.7    9.9    13.6    9.7    5.5 
Hungary    9.8    9.9    6.4    6.1    7.8 
Latvia      2.3    20.6    14.4    10.4    7.5 
Lithuania    3.5    16.4    16.4    11.4    5.8 
Poland     13.6    12.3    16.1    19    7.1 
Romania    8.2    6.7    7.1    8    5.8 
Russia     5.2    9.7    9.8    7.8    6.4 
Slovakia    11.4    11.3    18.6    18.1    9.5 
Ukraine    0.4    7.6    11.6    8.6    6.4 
 
Source: Lehmann and Muravyev (2010) who use ILO, IMF and Transmonee data. Note 
that 1992 rates are mostly for registered unemployment, while other years are ILO rates. 
 
Table 5: Net replacement rates for transition economies for initial (I) and long term 
(LT) unemployment in 2008 (for single individuals and one earner married couples 
with 2 children at 100% of average wage) 
 
Country    Single/no children    One earner couple+2 children 
      I  LT      I  LT 
Bulgaria    50  16      55  43 
Czech Republic  53  30      61  57 
Estonia  54  18      57  35 
Hungary    59  23      70  59 
Latvia      83  23      75  28 
Lithuania    61  16      63  59 
Poland     45  24      46  44 
Romania    42  8      44  24 
Slovakia    65  19      61  39 
Slovenia    64  33      86  78 
Comparators 
France     66  34      71  54 
Germany    60  36      72  63 
Netherlands    73  61      75  83 
Sweden    50  44      60  65 
UK      38  38      69  69 
USA      55  6      51  38 
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